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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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Abstract  
This paper uses management control, resource-based, systems-based, and 
contingency-based strategy theories to describe a large US manufacturing company’s efforts to 
improve profitability by designing and using a performance-measurement model (PMM). This 
PMM includes multiple performance measures relevant to its distribution channel for products, 
repair parts and maintenance services. The PMM is intended to reflect the company’s 
understanding of performance relations among strategic resources, operational capabilities, and 
desired financial outcomes. The PMM also reflects its intended distribution strategy, the types of 
performance necessary to achieve that strategy by its distributors, and its desired financial 
outcomes.  Furthermore, the company uses the model to evaluate its North American 
distributors and intends to use these evaluations as a partial basis for annual and long-term 
rewards. Thus, the PMM embodies the measurable portion of the firm’s management control 
system of its distribution channel.  
The study addresses four research questions: (1) Are measure attributes important 
considerations for performance measure choice? (2) Does the importance of attributes differ 
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according to firm strategy?  (3) Does the importance of attributes for design and use differ 
according to firm strategy?  (4) Does a company trade-off some individual attributes for others?  
The questions are investigated using qualitative and quantitative analyses of archival 
documents and interviews with top managers and distributors.  Principal findings are that 
measure attributes are important considerations for choice and change of performance 
measures; design attributes are more important than use attributes; the importance of attributes 
does not appear to differ according to strategy; and some individual attributes are traded-off for 
other attributes. 
Key Words:  performance-measurement model, management control, non-financial 
performance measures, strategy 
Introduction 
Improving performance measurement at key parts of the value chain is one of 
management accounting’s major roles. Valid performance measurement allows a firm to 
effectively describe and implement strategy, guide employee behavior, assess managerial 
effectiveness, and provide the basis for rewards.  Managers and researchers from diverse 
disciplines have sought to improve management of the value chain by building and using 
performance measurement models (PMM). PMM are comprehensive models of the firm as a 
system, which reflect organizational knowledge of the relations among various value-chain 
performance measures.  Many organizations reportedly have created PMM that model 
performance relations among key value-chain activities and valued outcomes (e.g., the 
balanced scorecard of Kaplan & Norton, 1996).   
Consulting reports, normative studies, and descriptive theories predict that these 
comprehensive models lead to superior performance. Magretta (2002) argues that business 
models are essential to tying insights to financial results.  Furthermore, knowledge-based and 
systems-based theories of the firm hypothesize that superior performance results from systemic 
management policies, rather than myopic focus on elements of the value chain (e.g., Huff & 
Jenkins, 2003; Morecroft, 2002; Sanchez & Heene, 1996). Empirical evidence supporting 
normative claims or theoretical hypotheses is scant and is usually in the form of uncritical self-
reports (e.g., Rucci et al., 1998; Barabba et al., 2002).   
Systematic management requires a comprehensive Management Control System 
(MCS), but not all of a MCS need be measurable. However, the portion that is feasibly 
measured should be considered for the PMM; otherwise, the organization might lose valuable 
performance information.  The choice of performance measures is critical in reflecting the 
organization as a system.  Since an organization is always adapting to its environment, it must 
be able to change its performance measures to reflect current conditions.  This study describes 
the determinants of a particular PMM and investigates the relatively unexplored issue of choice 
and change of a functioning PMM.   
1.1 Knowledge-based and systems-based theories and PMM 
Theories that explain management policies based on strategic resources, capabilities, 
learning, and systems offer guidance and predictions for the choice of performance measures. 
Recent strategic management literature has evolved the concept of a firm’s product strategy 
beyond Porter’s (1985) depiction of managing the value chain to achieve competitive advantage 
(e.g., through product cost leadership or differentiation). Porter’s work on the importance of 
strategic positioning has greatly influenced later work that seeks to explain how firms might use 
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their resources to attain strategic positioning. Research that followed Porter explains how firms 
reach and maintain the positions of strategic advantage that he described.  
Barney (1991) argues that successful firms achieve competitive advantage by acquiring 
and using unique resources to build inimitable capabilities that create strategic advantages (see 
also Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Organizational learning theory by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Senge (1990) predicts that successful firms create strategic 
advantages by learning dynamically to use their resources effectively. This learning is realized 
through development and deployment of the firm’s capabilities, processes, or competencies to 
use resources (e.g., Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Morecroft et al. (2002) hypothesize that 
successful firms manage strategic resources and capabilities through holistic management 
systems; that is, creating and maintaining strategic advantages are enhanced by systemic 
management.  Our accounting interpretation of current management theories is that firms create 
and maintain strategic advantages or positions by efficiently creating, deploying, and using 
performance-based MCS. Furthermore, the measurable part of the MCS should itself be 
systemic, in the form of a PMM. 
1.2 Prior work on PMM 
The DuPont ROI formula is an early and enduring PMM that disaggregates financial 
performance into manageable elements (e.g., Zimmerman, 1997, p. 187). EVA is a similar, 
more current and complex approach to identifying the incremental contribution to shareholder 
wealth and the manageable elements of periodic income (e.g., Adimando et al, 1994).  
Rappaport’s (1999) approach to building shareholder value recognizes incentive effects of over-
reliance on periodic financial results and seeks to mitigate disincentives.  Because all of these 
models focus primarily on financial outcomes, they do not qualify as systems models; that is, 
they do not model the determinants of financial performance even within the boundaries of the 
firm.    
More comprehensive PMM include Otley’s (1999) performance management model, 
Ittner and Larcker’s (2001) value-based management model, Epstein et al.’s (2000) APL model, 
Kanji’s business scorecard (Kanji & Moura e Sa, 2002) and the balanced scorecard (BSC) 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 2001).  These models describe links among business decisions and 
outcomes and serve to guide strategy development, communication, implementation, and 
feedback at multiple points along the value chain.  Because these comprehensive PMM are 
business models reflecting inputs and both intermediate and final outputs, they generally include 
measures of operational, strategic, financial and non-financial performance. These models truly 
represent efforts to use organizational knowledge to model the firm as a system and implement 
management control.  
This study investigates whether management control, knowledge-based and systems-
based theories of the firm are descriptive in a particular case. Although a study such as this 
cannot generalize to the population of firms using PMM, the findings of this study can illustrate 
the theories applied to this investigation (Yin, 1994) and can provide a foundation for theory 
improvement, replications, and large sample tests.  
This study addresses four research questions:  
RQ1: Are measure attributes important considerations for performance measure choice? 
RQ2: Does the importance of attributes differ according to firm strategy? 
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RQ3: Does the importance of attributes for design and use differ according to firm 
strategy?   
RQ4: Does a company trade-off some individual attributes for others? 
The questions are investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively using (1) archival 
documents that describe the company’s distribution PMM and (2) interviews with top managers 
to understand the nature of the business and the objectives and dynamic structure of the PMM.  
Finally, the paper reflects on the implications of this study for performance measurement and 
management control.  Subsequent sections of this paper address performance measure 
attributes, the research questions, the research site, analysis of qualitative and quantitative 
data, discussion of results, and conclusions. 
2.  Performance-Measure Attributes 
Management control theory argues that MCSs, which include PMMs, are intended to 
insure that employees (1) know what is expected of them, (2) will exert effort to do what is 
expected, (3) are capable of doing what is expected, and (4) accomplish what is expected (e.g., 
Merchant, 1998). For more than 30 years, researchers have known that firms choose a portfolio 
of controls and performance measures (e.g., Khandwalla, 1972). However, subsequent 
research on firms’ choices of performance measures often has focused on broad dichotomies of 
measures, such as financial vs. non-financial measures and mechanistic vs. organic controls. 
The theory commonly used in that research likewise characterizes the contingencies affecting 
choices of measures and controls as broad dichotomies (e.g., high vs. low environmental 
uncertainty; old vs. new technology).1  
One particularly popular research stream predicts that firms operating in complex and 
risky environments rely heavily on qualitative controls and non-financial performance measures 
and to a much lesser degree (if at all) on quantitative, financial-performance measures. 
Contingency research on choice of performance measures has yielded mixed results, perhaps 
because most of the reported studies are based on cross-sectional survey data, which can 
obscure the idiosyncrasies of firm-level definitions and implementations of performance 
measurements (e.g., Anderson & Young, 1999; Chenhall, 2003; Luft & Shields, 2002b). Enough 
evidence exists, however, to suggest that most firms rely to some degree on financial 
performance measures, and many use both quantitative and qualitative controls. In other words, 
firms evidently have great flexibility to choose the portfolio of measures and controls (especially 
when characterized as broad dichotomies) that they expect will work best in their situations. 
This equivocal result provides some motivation to search for additional theoretical explanation 
for the choice of performance measures. 2 
Recent management control research addresses specific factors that might explain 
firms’ choices of performance measures to achieve and maintain strategic advantages. 
Laboratory experiments (e.g., Libby et al, 2002; Lipe & Salterio, 2000; Luft & Shields, 2001, 
2002a) and surveys of management control practice (e.g., Ittner et al. 2002; Cavaluzzo & Ittner, 
2002; Ittner & Larcker, 1998) have identified attributes of performance measures that are 
                                                
1  See Chenhall (2003) for a comprehensive review of management control research and contingency theory. 
2 Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) discuss the concept of equifinality as a serious impediment to progress in 
understanding firm behavior via contingency theory. We agree with the concept of contingency theory that MCS and, 
hence, PMM are idiosyncratic but not random.  
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associated with use, usefulness, and performance.  When combined with current resource-
based and systems-based strategy theories, what emerges is a focus on performance 
measures’ attributes that supercede the popular financial vs. non-financial dichotomy.  In all 
cases, the literature cited in the following subsections presumes that the organization seeks to 
improve performance relative to its strategic goals.  
2.1 Measures are diverse and complementary 
Firms’ management controls can benefit from greater diversity of performance measures 
(i.e., operational, strategic, financial, and non-financial measures) if operational measures 
reflect the current drivers of future financial performance and are early in the value chain (Ittner 
& Larcker, 2002).  Milgrom & Roberts (1995) argue that, if a diverse set of performance 
measures is a complete and complementary set (or system), using a subset of measures leads 
to inferior performance. From a similar systems perspective, Warren (2002) argues that 
successful management policies (e.g., PMM) reflect resource interdependence and 
complementarity. 
2.2 Measures are objective and accurate 
Ijiri (1967) long ago re-established the theoretical importance of (accounting) 
performance measure accuracy and objectivity. This topic has not lost relevance.3 More 
recently, Libby et al. (2002) find that experimental subjects in management-control tasks rely on 
performance measures that have been verified by third parties, which might create demand for 
accurate and objective measures. Other studies have found that low-quality measurement is 
associated with low MCS use or impact (Cavaluzzo & Ittner, 2002; Ittner & Larcker, 1998). 
However, it is unclear ex ante if investing in measurements is superior to measuring the wrong 
things or the right things poorly, or avoiding unreliable measures altogether (e.g., Cavaluzzo & 
Ittner, 2002; Gates, 1999).  Objectivity (or verifiability) and accuracy (or error free) are 
theoretically independent concepts, yet are often coincident in practice with reference to 
performance measurement. 
2.3 Measures are informative  
Performance measures that differentiate managers facing similar, uncontrollable factors 
are informative. Informative measures can improve evaluations, even if they are not completely 
controllable by managers (e.g., Antle & Demski, 1988). In particular, early value-chain measures 
can be valuable if they are informative about managers’ leading actions (Ittner & Larcker, 2001) 
in sufficient time to take corrective control actions. 
2.4 Benefits outweigh costs of collection 
Monitoring employee behavior through a PMM is a costly activity.  Generating, 
organizing, and reporting performance information consume scarce company resources 
(Merchant, 1998; Simons, 2000).  As management accounting researchers have known since 
the early days of the field (e.g., Horngren, 1967), the perceived benefits of using performance 
measures should outweigh the associated costs.   
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2.5 Measures reflect system causality 
Some academics and consultants have prescribed forms of causal PMM (e.g., Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996; Epstein et al., 2000; Kanji & Moura e Sa, 2002). Regardless of the sources of 
business models, causal relations among firms’ multiple performance measures often are 
neither specified nor measured well (Ittner et al., 2002). Quantifying cause-and-effect relations 
between actions and outcomes at key points in the value chain could help predict future effects 
of current actions (e.g., Eccles, 1991). A functioning causal PMM also might free managers to 
focus more on strategy and evaluation issues (e.g., Kaplan & Norton, 2001) than on information 
processing.  Furthermore, a comprehensive, causal PMM might reduce the cognitive complexity 
of understanding and using multiple measures of performance (Luft & Shields, 2002a).  Strategy 
theorists predict significant benefits from building causal models of firms’ strategic resources 
and capabilities.   Huff (1990) and Huff and Jenkins (2002) describe these models as 
knowledge-based, cognitive maps, which can connect and organize dispersed organizational 
knowledge. 
2.6 Measures communicate strategy 
Models such as PMM facilitate communication, learning, and creation of new knowledge 
and can be the key tool to building a learning organization (Huff & Jenkins, 2003). The right 
performance measures align actions and strategy by reducing managers’ financial myopia 
(McKenzie & Schilling, 1998), and effectively communicate strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2001; 
Malina & Selto, 2001). Systemic management understands and exploits knowledge of dynamic 
interrelations among resources and capabilities. The elements of a PMM are intended to reflect 
the strategic use of resources and deployment of efficient processes [e.g., Sanchez et al., 
2002]. 
2.7 Measures create incentives for improvement 
Using performance measures that capture inherent time delays between certain 
decisions (e.g., investing in R&D and employee development) can lead to improved incentives 
(e.g., Rappaport, 1999; Cloutier & Boehlje, 2002). Ittner and Larcker (2001) also observe that 
operational measures, which have good “line of sight,” can increase the expectancy of rewards 
based on those measures (e.g., Green, 1992). 
2.8 Measures improve decision-making 
Organization of measures into distinct categories can affect decision-making, perhaps by 
reflecting the structure of knowledge about the firm’s value chain (Lipe & Salterio, 2000). 
Measures with tangible connections to processes being managed also might activate more 
knowledge and promote better learning and decision-making compared to relying on financial 
measures alone (Luft & Shields, 2001, 2002a). Huff and Jenkins (2002) argue that models (e.g., 
PMM) organize and express the rationale of complex systems, which aid planning and 
evaluation activities. Furthermore, such models can represent micro- or macro-levels of 
knowledge of activities, processes, and systems, thus aiding individuals at all levels of the 
organization. PMM might improve decision-making by identifying actions and impacts that 
heretofore have been hidden by traditional measurement systems (e.g., Huff & Jenkins, 2002).   
Management control and strategy theories identify eight desirable attributes of 
performance measures. Measures should be: 
A1  Diverse and complementary 
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A2  Objective and accurate 
A3  Informative 
A4  More beneficial than costly 
A5  Causally related 
A6  Strategic communication devices 
A7  Incentives for improvement 
A8  Supportive of improved decisions 
3.  Research Questions 
3.1 RQ1—Are measure attributes important considerations for performance measure 
choice? 
The discussions in section 2 provide extensive support for the prediction that an 
organization chooses measures for their PMM (initially and subsequently) based on at least the 
eight attributes summarized in this study. The initial choice of performance measures may be 
based on perceived expected attributes since little history exists upon which to base the 
assessment.  However, changes may occur after experience proves the perceptions correct or 
incorrect.  Therefore, this study predicts that an organization will delete previously chosen PMM 
measures, which after experience, are perceived to not exhibit these attributes.  Whether for 
initial choice or subsequent change, the theoretical basis for attribute importance remains the 
same.  We expect that a company chooses measures that it expects to have the eight attributes 
and keeps only those that display the attributes in practice. 
More specifically, contingency-based research has shown that firm strategy can affect 
the design of PMM (Chenhall, 2003).  These studies typically use one of several taxonomies to 
describe firms’ strategies, including entrepreneurial or conservative (Miller & Friesen, 1982), 
prospector, analyzer, or defender (Miles & Snow, 1978), build, hold, or harvest (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1984), and product differentiation or cost leadership (Porter, 1980).  More 
conservative strategies include defender, harvest, and cost leadership, while more 
entrepreneurial strategies are prospector, build, and product differentiation.  Guilding (1999) 
found that companies following a prospector or build strategy are more likely to use a broad 
scope of PMM information.  Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) found that companies with a build 
strategy are more inclined to use subjective controls than those pursuing a harvest strategy.  
Several studies find that firms following a more conservative strategy place more emphasis on 
cost control than those following a more entrepreneurial strategy (Chenhall & Morris, 1995; 
Dent, 1990; Simons, 1987).  Bouwens and Abernethy (2000) found that firms going through a 
strategic change process, typically categorized as an entrepreneurial activity, place more 
importance on integrated PMM information.  Finally, Abernethy and Brownell (1999) found that 
hospitals following a prospector strategy focused more attention on dialogue, communication 
and learning.  No prior strategic-fit work was found leading to a strategy-based preference for 
attributes of informativeness and incentives for improvement.  Table 1 maps the prior strategic-
fit research to the eight performance measure attributes in Table 1. 
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=




Table 1. Framework for Performance-Measure Attributes 
 
 Strategy  
Performance- 
Measure Attribute 
Entrepreneurial Firm  








A1  Diverse and 
complementary 
X  Guilding, 1999 
A2  Objective and 
accurate 
 X Govindarajan & Gupta, 
1985 
A3  Informative ? 
 
? No studies of 
informativeness related 
to strategy 
A4  Benefit exceeds 
cost 
 X Chenhall & Morris, 1995 
Dent, 1990 
Simons, 1987 
A5  Causally related X  Bouwens & Abernethy, 
2000 
A6  Strategic 
communication 
device 
X  Abernethy & Brownell, 
1999 
A7  Incentive for 
improvement 
? ? No studies of incentives 
related to strategy 
A8  Improved 
decision-making 
X  Abernethy & Brownell, 
1999 
Although each of the eight attributes is desirable (ceteris paribus), strategic-fit research 
implies that some attributes may be more relevant than others depending upon company 
strategy.  It is expected that firms following an entrepreneurial strategy will be more likely to 
prefer measures that are diverse and complementary (A1), causally related (A5), strategic 
communication devices (A6), and improve decision-making (A8).  It is also expected that firms 
following a more conservative strategy will tend to prefer performance measures that are 
objective and accurate (A2) and more beneficial than costly (A4).   
3.3 RQ3—Does the importance of attributes for design and use differ according to firm 
strategy?   
Although all eight are desirable attributes, a company may deem some more relevant 
than others when designing or using measures in a PMM.  The exploratory third question 
explores subjective classifications of the eight attributes as being primarily being driven by either 
design or use concerns.  Performance measure attributes reflecting primarily design 
considerations are diverse and complementary (A1), objective and accurate (A2), informative 
(A3), more beneficial than costly (A4), and causally related (A5).  Although all performance 
measures are at least minimally designed, we conjecture that some are selected as means to 
achieve specific ends. They can be used to communicate strategy (A6), provide incentives for 
improvement (A7), and improve decision-making (A8).  We test whether the importance differs 
according to this partition of design and use attributes.  
Because it is possible that a measure can be useful and kept in a PMM even if it does 
not exhibit all attributes, we also explore whether an organization trades-off one attribute for 
another. The strategic-fit literature cited previously can lead one to expect tradeoffs when 
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measures’ attributes are not consistently high. For example, a company following conservative 
strategies, given costly measurement, might (not) choose or retain a measure that is high (low) 
on accuracy and objectivity but low (high) on strategic communication. A more entrepreneurial 
firm, on the other hand, might (not) choose or retain a measure that is high (low) on improved 
decision making but low (high) on the benefit-cost ratio. Although one generally might expect 
these tradeoffs, they would be quite difficult to predict for a specific firm without having more 
precise attribute measurements. Thus, the fourth research question also is exploratory. 
Figure 1 summarizes the four research questions. 










RQ2 - Does the importance






RQ4 - Does a company
trade-off some individual
attributes for others?
RQ3- Does the importance
of attributes for design and







4.  Research Site 
The research takes place within a single firm to benefit from close investigation of (1) a 
PMM developed by the firm, not imposed by the researchers (or external consultants), (2) 
measures of performance relevant to that firm, not generic measures that might or might not 
apply to the firm, and (3) access to multiple levels of managers to enrich the understanding of 
the origins and uses of the PMM. Thus, this study offers some advantages compared to cross-
sectional analysis at the firm level, particularly given the difficulty of comparably describing 
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performance measurement in many firms simultaneously [e.g., Luft and Shields, 2002b]. This 
study had access to company documents, archival data, and employees at various levels. 
This study focuses on a PMM developed by a US FORTUNE 500 equipment 
manufacturer for its distribution channel.4  The company employs over 25,000 people in its 
domestic and foreign operations. Competition is from similarly large domestic and international 
firms.  The company sells its major equipment assemblies through OEM contracts and 
independent, exclusive distributors, who also sell repair parts and maintenance services. The 
distribution system is the company’s primary contact with retail customers.  Each distributor 
operates within an assigned geographic area. The distributors may not compete with each other 
or sell competitors’ products or services. While the distributorships are independent entities, 
most are owned by individuals with prior company experience. 
4.1 Company Strategy 
Per archival documents, the company follows five strategic initiatives, which are: 
1. Demonstrate a comparative advantage in each of our markets worldwide, 
measured in product performance, economic value to the customer and all 
aspects of customer support.  
2. Achieve an average return on equity of at least x% over economic cycles in order 
to afford the investment required to sustain a comparative advantage in each 
market into the future, and afford investment in new business. 
3. Grow in order to provide superior total return to our shareholders over time. 
4. Demonstrate our commitment to help improve the community in which we 
operate and be a responsible citizen of society. 
5. Attract, train, challenge and fully utilize people at all levels in order to achieve 
these objectives. 
The company’s strategy can be characterized along the lines of conservative, defender, 
harvest, and cost leader.  Competitive advantage is gained by aggressively preventing 
competitors from entering the primary product market.  Product performance, quality and 
efficiency have been the company’s means to success.  
Historically, the company has managed its distributors top-down and strictly by the 
impact on the company’s “bottom-line.”  However, recent changes in the marketplace have 
affected the company’s approach to measuring distributor performance.  Because both 
domestic and foreign competitors now have similar products, competition for market share has 
shifted to customer service.  In response to this increased competition, the company revised its 
distributor strategy to focus attention and resources on improving customer service and 
customer satisfaction. 
The company’s top-down approach to distributor management is consistent with the 
theory that firms following a conservative strategy rely more heavily on centralized control 
systems and on feed-forward control (Langfield-Smith, 1997).  Its main distribution goal is 
                                                
4 The company has created PMM for other elements of its value chain but gave access to only the distribution PMM. 
Other PMMs reportedly are being used successfully. 
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improving the primary market share for its products.  Profitability at the distributor level was 
important (particularly to distributors) but less important than primary market share because 
most of the company’s profit derived from sales in this market.  Again, this supports the 
classification of the company strategy as more conservative.  Conservative companies tend to 
use control systems that signal the need for innovation by highlighting substantial drops in 
market share and declining profitability (Miller & Freisen, 1982).    
4.2 Distributor Performance Model 
A major step in the company’s management of its distribution system was to develop a 
strategically oriented PMM for its 31 North American distributorships that communicates the 
new customer focus, guides distributors, and provides additional bases for evaluation. This 
study will refer to the company’s distributor performance model as the DPM.5   
According to company documents, the purposes of the DPM are to: 
• Highlight areas within distributorships that need improvement to enhance customer 
relations, 
• Provide an objective set of criteria, consistent with the company’s strategic initiatives, to 
guide and measure total distributor performance, 
• Be used as the starting point for the three-year distributor contract renewal process, and 
• Be used for comparing and ranking distributors and, perhaps, for performance-based 
compensation. 
The DPM was developed internally by company employees—without the aid of external 
consultants.  As was customary in this company, a top-down approach was used.  The DPM 
designers created the initial DPM with selective input from distributor personnel, although the 
designers had the final say.  The DPM was designed to focus on outcomes that the company 
felt were important for the distributors to accomplish in order to meet company goals, not 
necessarily distributor goals.  Therefore, the company’s key success factors do not perfectly 
mirror those of its distributors.6 
The data for this study come from interviews with managers, from company documents 
and from archival performance data.  During the second quarter of 1999, sixteen interviews 
were conducted: nine with distributor-owners and seven with DPM designers and 
administrators.  Distributors, designer and administrator views were sought in order to have a 
360 degree view of the DPM process.7  The length of the telephone interview was determined 
by how much the interviewee had to say; all lasted between 45 and 75 minutes.  The 
researchers asked each interviewee the following open questions:8 
1. In your own words, what is the DPM? 
                                                
5 Company employees refer to the DPM as a “balanced scorecard,” but the term has acquired a generic label that 
might obscure the unique characteristics of this PMM. 
6 For a discussion of the conflict resulting from this initial mismatch, see Malina and Selto (2001). 
7 For a complete discussion of the sampling technique, see Malina and Selto (2001). 
8 These interviews also were used to explore communication effectiveness in Malina and Selto (2001). The present 
study reflects an independent use and extension of these qualitative data. 
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2. What do you think is the objective of the DPM? 
3. What are the nine measures that distributors report really measuring? 
4. What are the measures that are filled out by the company really measuring? 
5. How do the measures that distributors report relate to the company’s measures?  
6. Do the measures help you in any way?  
7. Are there any benefits from the DPM itself?  
8. Do you have any (other) recommendations for improving the DPM? 
Note that the questions do not directly prompt respondents to discuss the factors that 
are predicted to determine choices or changes in either measures or weights. The questions 
were purposefully generic (providing a framework for discussing DPM measures) but not directly 
asking about choice or change.  Interviewees freely revealed these factors during the 
interviews. Their unprompted responses were used to support or deny the predictions. 9  
Company documents provided archival background for the structure of the DPM and 
quantitative data for each quarterly DPM from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 
2001.  The interviews were analyzed using qualitative data software (Atlas.ti).  Qualitative data 
software is used to systematically code the qualitative data.  A predetermined set of codes was 
used to identify portions of interview text referring to a choice or a change in DPM measures 
according to each of the eight attributes developed from the literature.  Although all respondents 
had multiple, coded comments, the coding procedure gave each respondent only a single code 
for each intersection of performance measure and attribute. Thus, if one interviewee, for 
example, offered a paragraph describing the accuracy of a specific measure, this response 
generated a single set of codes—one code for the measure and one for the attribute. For each 
coded comment regarding an attribute, an additional code was attached regarding whether the 
measure was dropped from the DPM or remained on the DPM during the time period tested.10 
This restrictive approach to coding qualitative data is designed to illustrate or test theory. 11  A 





                                                
9 Perhaps respondents would have made more comments specific to the hypothesized attributes if we had posed 
direct questions. However, we wanted to avoid responses that were artifacts of leading questions. We do not have 
the luxury of a parallel case study where we could have asked leading questions to compare with our results. 
10 Two researchers independently coded the qualitative data. The average coding reliability between the two coders 
was 87%, which falls above the minimum norm of 80 percent coding reliability (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Coding 
discrepancies were reconciled by consensus. The consensus coding supports the reported qualitative analyses. For 
a complete discussion of insuring coding reliability, see Malina and Selto (2001). 
11 Miles and Huberman (1994) provide extensive explanations of alternative coding methods. 
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Table 2. Coding Scheme 
Code 
1.1   A1+: Diverse and complementary 
1.2   A1-: Not diverse and complementary 
2.1   A2+: Objective and accurate 
2.2   A2-: Not objective and accurate 
3.1   A3+: Informative 
3.2   A3-: Not informative 
4.1   A4+: Strategic communication devices 
4.2   A4-: Not strategic communication devices 
5.1   A5+: Incentives for improvement 
5.2   A5-: No incentives for improvement 
6.1   A6+: Supportive of improved decisions 
6.2   A6-: Not supportive of improved decisions
7.1   A7+: More beneficial than costly 
7.2   A7-: Not more beneficial than costly 
8.1   A8+: Causally related 
8.2   A8-: Not causally related 
9.1   Measure dropped from DPM 
9.2   Measure kept on DPM 
5.  Data Analysis 
Section 5 is divided into two sub-sections.  The first sub-section describes evidence 
regarding the initial choice of performance measures.  The second sub-section uses both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses to evaluate interview evidence related to the eight 
attributes regarding changes of performance measures.  
Throughout the four years covered by this research, the company made many changes 
to the DPM.  Weightings changed, measures were added, and measures were dropped.  The 
initial DPM (implemented in the first quarter of 1998) and the revised DPM are shown in table 3.  
Table 4 contains DPM measure definitions.  The most obvious change in the revised DPM is a 
reduction in the number of measures included.  The first DPM contained 29 measures while the 
most recent has 14.  Also, all three of the “people” measures (performance reviews, industry 
involvement, and training) were dropped from the DPM.  Of the fifteen measures dropped from 
the initial DPM, fourteen were eliminated at the end of 1999.   
 =
=




Table 3. Comparison of Distributor Performance Models 
Q1 1998 to Q4 2001 
Q1 1998 Q4 2001 
Measure Weight Measure Weight
Customer Satisfaction 3.0 Customer Satisfaction 10 
Market Share – Traditional Market  27.0   
Market Share – New Market 1 3.0   
Market Share – New Market 2 3.0   
Dealer Survey 2.0 Dealer Survey 10 
Parts Fill Rate 3.0 Parts Fill Rate 5 
Service Cycle Time 10.0   
CME 3.0   
Best Practices 1.0   
PBIT as % of Sales 4.0 PBIT as % of Sales 10 
Cash Flow as % of Sales 2.0   
Parts Inventory Turns 2.0 Parts Inventory Turns 5 
Whole Goods Inventory Turns 2.0 Whole Goods Inventory Turns 5 
Days Sales Outstanding 2.0 Days Sales Outstanding 5 
Service Utilization 2.0 Service Utilization 5 
Parts Sales Growth (traditional) 2.0 Parts Sales Growth (traditional) 5 
Service Sales Growth (traditional) 2.0 Service Sales Growth (traditional) 5 
New Market 1 Sales Growth 2.0 New Market 1 Sales Growth 10 
New Market 2 Sales Growth 1.0 New Market 2 Sales Growth 10 
Other Sales Growth 2.0   
Environmental Assessment 2.0   
Safety 2.0 Safety 5 
Performance Reviews 1.0   
Industry Involvement 1.0   
Training 2.0   
Warranty Audit 8.0   
Building Condition 3.0   
Policy Dollars 2.0   
Days to Fin. Statement Submission 1.0   
  Image 10 
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Table 4. DPM Measure Definitions 
Measure Definition 
Customer Satisfaction Score on customer satisfaction event card 
Market Share Measures  
     Market Share – 
Traditional Market 
Monthly percentage of distributor share of total traditional market 
     Market Share – New 
Market 1 
Monthly percentage of distributor share of total new market 1 
     Market Share – New 
Market 2 
Monthly percentage of distributor share of total new market 2 
Dealer Survey Annual survey of dealer satisfaction with distribution system 
Parts Fill Rate  Percentage of parts orders filled within 24 hours 
Service Cycle Time Percent of service repairs diagnosed within one hour and 
completed within six hours 
CME Audit of distributor use of Company Marketing Excellence system 
Best Practices Number of best practices submitted or number of best practices 
implemented from data base in the last 12 month period 
PBIT as % of Sales PBIT as a percentage of sales 
Cash Flow as % of Sales Cash flow from operations as a percentage of sales 
Parts Inventory Turns Parts cost of sales divided by average parts inventory 
Whole Goods Inventory 
Turns 
Whole goods cost of sales divided by average parts inventory 
Days Sales Outstanding Average trade receivable balance divided by sales per day 
Service Utilization Technician hours billed divided by hours available to be billed 
Parts Sales Growth 12 quarter rolling regression over the most recent 12 quarters parts 
sales growth 
Service Sales Growth 12 quarter rolling regression over the most recent 12 quarters non-
warranty sales growth 
New Market 1 Sales 
Growth 
12 quarter rolling regression over the most recent 12 quarters new 
market 1 sales growth 
New Market 2 Sales 
Growth 
12 quarter rolling regression over the most recent 12 quarters new 
market 2 sales growth 




If distributor has completed an environmental assessment per 
Company guidelines. 
Safety Lost-time accidents per 200,000 hours worked 
People Measures  
     Performance Reviews Random sample of percent of employees evaluated annually 
     Industry Involvement Evidence of membership in industry and trade associations 
     Training Percent of hours spent on training per hours worked 
Warranty Audit Percent of compliance of warranty repairs 
Building Condition Company determined rating of distributor properties 
Policy Dollars Comparison of actual versus planned expenditure on non-warranty 
repairs 
Days to Fin. Statement 
Submission 
Number of days from close of accounting period to submission of 
financial statement to Company 
Image (Not implemented at the time of this research) 
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Other obvious changes in the DPM are the weights assigned to measures.  In the first 
DPM, weightings ranged from 1.0 to 27 points.  As the company shortened the DPM, remaining 
measures ultimately were given either a 5- or 10-point weight. Table 5 chronicles the revisions 
in the weights assigned to the measures dropped from the DPM over the study period.   





















































                
   Market 
Share – Trad. 
Mkt  
27 28 28 28 28 18 18 18 10 10 10 10 10    
   Market 
Share – New 
Mkt 1 
3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7         
   Market 
Share – New 
Mkt 2 
3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7         
Service cycle 
time 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10         
CME 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3         
Best Practices 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3         
Cash Flow 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2         
Environmental 
Assessment 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2         
People 
Measures 
                
     
Performance 
Reviews 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1         
     Industry 
Involvement 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1         
     Training 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2         
Warranty 
Audit 
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8         
Building 
Condition 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3         
Policy Dollars 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2         
Days to Fin. 
Stmt Sub. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1         
 
The following subsections discuss evidence from the interviews that indicates support or 
lack of support for predicted reasons behind the company’s initial choices of all measures and 
changes to them. 
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5.1 Initial choice of performance measures 
Company designers and managers volunteered eleven comments regarding how and 
why the initial measures appeared on the DPM.  The most cited reason (5 comments, or almost 
half of total comments) for including the initial measures was that they are objective and 
accurate.  A company employee stated: 
The objective of the DPM is to have an objective, documented, factual 
measurement system rather than a subjective one. 
Several interviewees commented that the initial measures were chosen for strategic 
communication and causality.  Three comments were made that the initial measures were 
designed to communicate the corporate strategy down to the distributor level.  A DPM designer 
stated: 
The measures were chosen to dovetail the core objectives. 
The measures were also chosen with cause-and-effect relations in mind.  Three 
comments were made that, by design, the initial DPM measures were intuitively related to each 
other.  A DPM designer commented: 
The theory of how the measures tie together is good.  There are logical 
correlations. 
The coded interviews show objectivity and accuracy, strategic communication devices 
and causality as the primary bases for initial choices of DPM measures.  The company’s 
conservative tradition can be seen in its emphasis on objectivity and accuracy in performance 
measures.  However, the change in the approach to measuring distributor performance appears 
as emphasis was also placed on the attributes of strategic communication and causality.   
5.2 Analysis of RQ1—Are measure attributes important considerations for performance 
measure choice? 
5.2.1 Qualitative analysis of RQ1 
The following subsections describe the results of the qualitative analysis of changes in 
measures summarized in Table 6.  Table 6 presents the distributions of codes, by positive or 
negative form of the attributes, for measures dropped from the DPM and for those retained on 
the DPM.  Columns record the frequency of comments associated with dropped and kept 
measures. Rows record the frequency of comments associated with positive and negative 
perceptions.  The code frequencies in columns 1 and 2 are meant to reassure the reader that 
the authors did not selectively focus on unrepresentative comments for the analyses that follow.  
Column 3 shows the number of respondents comprising the frequency of comment and is 
meant to reassure the reader that one or two interviewees did not dominate the results. 
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Design Attributes    
     A1+: Diverse and complementary 0 3 3 
     A1-: Not Diverse and complementary 11 4 8 
          Total 11 7  
     A2+: Objective and accurate 14 12 13 
     A2-: Not Objective and accurate 46 19 13 
          Total 60 31  
     A3+: Informative 0 0 0 
     A3-: Not Informative 0 0 0 
          Total 0 0  
     A4+: Benefits exceed costs 3 2 3 
     A4-: Costs exceed benefits 17 0 9 
          Total 20 2  
     A5+: Causally related 13 23 13 
     A5-: Not Causally related 4 0 4 
          Total 17 23  
Use Attributes    
     A6+: Strategic communication 
devices 
17 6 13 
     A6-: Not Strategic communication 
devices 
1 0 1 
          Total 18 6  
     A7+: Incentives for improvement 18 6 14 
     A7-: No Incentives for improvement 2 3 5 
          Total 20 9  
     A8+: Supportive of improved 
decisions 
20 7 9 
     A8-: Not Supportive of improved 
decisions 
3 0 3 
          Total 23 7  
Total Positive Comments 85 59  
Total Negative Comments 84 26  
     Total Comments 169 85  
5.2.1.1 Diverse and complementary (A1).  The DPM was intended to be a broad set of 
measures that encompasses the activities that distributors must manage well to create a 
successful distributorship. The original intent was to reinforce that distributors needed to look at 
all aspects of the business, from hiring and training employees to winning market share. 
Distributors recognized the complementarity of the DPM’s diverse measures. For example, 
We can’t have good results without good people who are trained. We 
can’t have good customer satisfaction without good fill rate and cycle time 
results.  They all relate to sales growth and profitability. I see them definitely 
[as complementary].  
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Most distributors, however, complained about the lack of diversity in original market-
share measures.  Distributors felt that traditional market-share measures were overrepresented 
and over-weighted on the DPM.  Distributors face diverse opportunities. Some make most of 
their profit from the traditional, mature market, but many can earn more from the new, growing 
markets. Although diverse market-share measures were included on the initial DPM, only the 
traditional measure carried significant weight.     
They aren’t measuring anything but [traditional] business.  [sarcastically:] 
If they are only interested in about one-third of their business, then it’s good. 
The measures chosen to be on the DPM were to be diverse and complementary.  As 
noted above, this was not perceived always to be the case.  Of the 18 comments coded to this 
attribute, 15 supported the negative form that measures are not diverse and complementary.   
5.2.1.2 Objective and accurate (A2).  Objectivity, accuracy, reliability, and auditability 
appear to have been the company’s and distributors’ primary concerns for DPM measures. 
Interviewees commented on this attribute most frequently, with 91 comments in total.     
The traditional market-share measure dominated the original DPM in part because it was 
highly objective and accurate. 
We know every single [product in the traditional market] that gets sold to 
the tenth of a percentage point. 
In contrast, the new market-share measures were perceived to be less accurate and 
less objective.  
How we would measure [new] market share is strictly information we 
would generate ourselves.    
Almost every distributor commented on certain measures being inaccurate or subject to 
manipulation.  In general, the distributors felt that the people measures were not well defined or 
verifiable.  Six of the nine distributors mentioned that these measures involved some guessing 
and that there was no rigorous audit process in place to verify the data reported.  Early in the life 
of the DPM, the distributors manually collected and reported service cycle time, which the 
company dropped after a few years. Six of the nine distributors commented on the lack of 
accuracy in reporting this measure.   
I’m going to make that number look as good as I can without outright lying 
or cheating. 
DPM administrators also were aware that the measure might not be accurate. 
I wouldn’t put a lot of stock in either the [service cycle-time measures] we 
got before or the ones on this scorecard. 
Nearly every measure dropped from the DPM lacked perceived objectivity and/or 
accuracy. The exception was the traditional market-share measure which was replaced with the 
almost equally objective sales-growth measure.  The majority of the comments supported the 
negative form of the attribute that measures are neither objective nor accurate. 
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5.2.1.3 Informative (A3).  Relatively few respondents indicated that informativeness was 
an important design criterion. The company uses the DPM to compare, benchmark, and rank 
distributorships and as a stimulus to peer communication. Each distributor receives its own 
report and its relative numerical ranking (e.g., 7th out of 31). To promote information exchange 
and competition; the names of distributors achieving top ratings are posted on the company’s 
intranet for all distributors to see. 
Individuals can determine their performance against someone else in the 
corporation performing the same function, so they would know how effective 
they were at accomplishing their goals and their tasks. 
Several distributors recognized the influence of peer pressure on their behavior. 
Anytime you publish a report and there are 31 entities being measured 
using the same metric, you create competition. We are competitive, so it 
matters what rank you are. Even if no one looks at the rank, I want to be #1. 
Qualitative evidence exists to support the importance of DPM informativeness, but not 
necessarily at the individual-measure level. That is, the company appears to use the overall 
DPM score to rank distributor performance more than the scores on individual measures.  
Therefore, this attribute cannot be analyzed at the individual-measure level and will be withheld 
from the quantitative analyses that follow. 
5.2.1.4 Costs versus benefit (A4).  The company perceived a number of DPM measures 
to be misleading or unreliable and also perceived the costs of resolving disputes about these 
subjective measures to be greater than the benefits derived.  Seventeen comments stated that 
the cost to compile or the time spent resolving disputes outweighed the benefits received from 
collecting the measure.  The performance evaluation and service cycle-time measures in 
particular were seen as consuming too many resources.   
To do [performance evaluations] four times a year for everyone in the 
company, there aren’t enough hours in the day.  They need to find something 
more appropriate for technicians and clerks. 
It’s just adding time and effort to report [service cycle time] to the 
company.  If we’re doing this, we’re not doing things for the customer. 
Agreement existed among the interviewees that the cost of some measures exceeded 
their benefits, providing support for the negative form of this attribute. 
5.2.1.5 Causally related (A5).  The causal nature of the DPM was intended by designers 
and generally perceived by distributors. The DPM measures were grouped and saliently 
displayed to guide decisions and recognize the company’s beliefs about the relations among 
measures within the group. Representative comments from distributors reflect the intuition and 
general belief in the DPM’s causal relations.  
A lot of business tends to run with financial and market share measures. 
Those are pretty crude handles. You have to get underneath to things like 
quality and cycle times, and softer things like employee development. That’s 
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My intuition is that the growth goals help drive market levels, but we don’t 
know the quantitative consequences. Some measures are more tightly 
correlated, but I don’t have a sense of which of these are the key ones that 
seem to have the most leverage compared to others. 
Ninety percent of the comments coded to this attribute supported the positive form that 
DPM measures reflect causality.   
5.2.1.6 Strategic communication devices (A6).  At the time of the DPM rollout, the 
company also launched its new customer-oriented objective. The original DPM measures 
covered the value-chain activities that the company felt were critical to creating a distributorship 
that competes successfully on customer satisfaction—the keystone of the company’s strategy to 
sustain market share. DPM designers observed: 
Those [measures and categories] are right in line with the strategic 
initiatives, aligned with our customer and quality objectives. We try to dovetail 
any plans the company has into those objectives. 
All but one comment were in support of the positive form of A6 that measures are 
strategic communication devices.  Distributors and designers all agreed that DPM measures 
helped communicate corporate strategy to the distribution system. 
5.2.1.7 Incentives for improvement (A7).  The comments regarding incentive effects of 
DPM measures were generally in support of the positive form of this attribute that measures 
provided incentives for improvement.  Service cycle time, best practices, and people measures 
were all cited as creating incentives for distributors to improve performance.   
Best practice is a positive measure because it forces you to take a look at 
other ways to run your business. 
Comments regarding market share were split.  Distributors commented that the 
emphasis on traditional market was discouraging to those distributors who saw more growth 
potential in the newer markets. 
If you did poorly on [the traditional market share] and well on [the new 
market share measures], then you’re still viewed as a poor distributor.  
The ultimate control over distributor behavior has been the three-year contract review, 
when the company evaluates distributor performance and either renews or terminates the 
relationship.  The DPM in total is intended to provide a constructive and evaluative structure and 
to be an objective basis for the contract review. Designers stated: 
The only incentive is losing the distributorship and [the DPM] is the 
centerpiece of the contract review. 
The stick might be more evident than any carrot, because as one top manager candidly 
stated,  
It [the DPM] helps when it comes time to terminate a distributor. If you’ve 
set up goals and a distributor has failed to achieve them, you can get around 
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sales representation and franchise laws for wrongful termination. It’s not the 
primary objective, but it’s a benefit. 
Nearly every comment supported the positive form of A7 that measures provide 
incentives for improvement.  
5.2.1.8 Supportive of improved decisions (A8).  The company chose measures for the 
DPM to reflect the activities and types of financial and non-financial performance believed to be 
effective to achieve increased company profitability. Most distributors agreed: 
The elements and the structure [of the DPM] are outstanding, and they 
have a lot of potential to help us all improve. […] I grew up working for a CPA 
and he ingrained in me that, if you can’t measure it, you can’t improve it. 
Several of the measures on the initial DPM that were subsequently eliminated also were 
perceived to be helpful for decision-making.  In regard to training, one distributor mentioned: 
 As a result of the measure, we more formally measure this.  I like that 
because it lets me see which areas of the company are doing training and 
which aren’t.  I can chat with those not doing training.  They get so tied up 
doing other work that it’s hard to put time aside. 
The service cycle-time measure, when it was part of the DPM, did affect decision-
making in the service process at most distributorships.  Distributors often mentioned that it 
helped them to redesign processes and re-schedule work. 
I wasn’t an advocate [of the service cycle-time measure] at the start, but 
now I am.  It tells us to quickly figure out what’s wrong so we can make an 
intelligent statement to the customer, so they can say go ahead or not.  We 
have been able to flow more work through our show by getting the quick, 
easy stuff through the shop. […] It’s helping us. 
All but three comments supported DPM measures as being helpful in day-to-day 
managing and decision-making, therefore providing support for the positive form of the attribute.   
5.2.2 Quantitative analysis of RQ1—Are measure attributes important considerations for 
performance measure choice? 
If theories of performance measurement choice are descriptive, comments from 
interviewees should tend to reflect favorable perceptions of the attributes of retained measures 
(the positive form of the attributes), whereas comments should reflect unfavorable perceptions 
of the attributes of dropped measures (the negative form of the attributes).  Table 7 presents the 
distributions of codes, by positive or negative form of the attributes, for measures dropped from 
the DPM and for those retained on the DPM.  A chi-square test compares the observed 
distribution of comments to the expected distribution, which assumes that dropping or keeping a 
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Table 7. Research Question 1: 
Positive versus Negative Comments 
Analysis of Attribute Codes and Measure Retention 
 
















       
     Positive 
comments 
85 59 96 48 8.42 0.01 
     Negative 
comments 
84 26 73 37   
          Total 
comments 
169 85     
       
The Chi-square test of RQ1 indicates that the comment pattern is not random, but is 
significantly different (p < 0.01) from the expected (no effect) distribution. This result reinforces 
the fact that the qualitative results that measure attributes are important considerations for 
dropping or keeping DPM measures. Retained measures are more likely to have positive forms 
of the attributes, and dropped measures are more likely to have negative forms of the attributes.  
This result, which is consistent with the theory presented in section 2, demonstrates that 
measure attributes are important considerations for performance-measure choice. 
Research question 2 asks if organizational strategy is related to the relative importance 
placed on performance-measure attributes.  As described in the previous section, the company 
itself follows a rather conservative strategy and is expected to prefer conservative performance 
measures. Table 8 presents the distributions of codes, by positive or negative form, of attributes 
expected to be consistent with a conservative strategy and of those expected to be consistent 
with an entrepreneurial strategy.   
The Chi-square tests of the conservative and entrepreneurial strategy attributes indicate 
that the patterns are not random, and significant differences exist between the observed and 
expected (no effect) distributions (p < 0.025).  For the conservative attributes test, the largest 
impact on the Chi-square statistic results from a larger-than-expected number of positive 
comments about retained measures. Conversely, for the entrepreneurial attributes test, the 
largest impact on the Chi-square statistics stems from a smaller-than-expected number of 
negative comments that are associated with retained measures. These results indicate that both 
conservative and entrepreneurial attributes have been important to the company’s choices, in 
subtly different ways. Measures consistent with a conservative strategy were retained if they 
were positively perceived, while measures consistent with an entrepreneurial strategy appear to 
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Table 8. Research Question 2: 
Conservative versus Entrepreneurial Strategy Attributes 
Analysis of Attribute Codes and Measure Retention 
















      
     Positive comments – 
Conservative Attributes 
a 
17     14c 22     9c 5.26 0.025 
     Negative comments 
– Conservative 
Attributes 
63   19 58 24   
          Total comments 80   33     
       
Entrepreneurial 
Attributes 
      
     Positive comments – 
Entrepreneurial 
Attributes b 
50  39 55 34 5.40 0.025 
     Negative comments 
– Entrepreneurial 
Attributes 
19     4c 14     9c   
          Total comments 69 43     
       
a Attributes predicted to be most applicable for a conservative strategy are A2 (objective and 
accurate) and A4 (cost versus benefit). 
b Attributes predicted to be most applicable for an entrepreneurial strategy are A1 (diverse and 
complementary), A5 (causally related), A6 (strategic communication device), and A8 (improved decision-
making). 
c Distribution value that contributes the most to the Chi-square statistic.  The 5-comment variance 
represents a 55.5% difference between the actual and expected distribution. 
5.4 Quantitative analysis of RQ3—Does the importance of attributes for design and use 
differ according to firm strategy?   
Table 9 presents the distributions of comment codes, by positive or negative form, of the 
attributes divided into design and use.  This exploratory Chi-square test indicates that the 
overall pattern is not random, but is significantly different (p < 0.001) from the expected (no 
effect) distribution. The largest impact on the Chi-square statistic comes from positive 
comments about design attributes. Next, strategy is introduced to investigate whether firm 
strategy affects the importance of design and use attributes.  Since attributes associated with a 
more conservative strategy are exclusively design attributes, the Chi-square test is run solely for 
design attributes. Thus, this test is identical to that reported in Table 8; the firm appears to have 
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considered positive design attributes identified with a more conservative strategy when deciding 
to retain a performance measure (p < 0.025). 
The final Chi-square test indicates that the firm also considered design attributes 
associated with an entrepreneurial strategy to be important considerations (p < 0.001).  Thus, 
design attributes of measures appear to dominate usage attributes, regardless of the strategic 
orientation of measures.  
Table 9. Research Question 3: 
Design versus Use Attributes 
Analysis of Attribute Codes and Measure Retention 















Overall       
     Positive comments – 
Design attributes a 
30   40d 47   23d 24.61 0.001 
     Negative comments – 
Design attributes  
78 23 67 34   
     Positive and negative 
comments – Use attributesb 
61 22 55 28   
          Total comments 169 85     
       
Conservative       
     Positive comments – 
Design attributes  
17   14e 22    9e 5.26 0.025 
     Negative comments – 
Design attributes  
63 19 58 24   
Total comments 80 33     
       
Entrepreneurial       
     Positive comments – 
Design attributes  
13  26f  24  15f 20.28 0.001 
     Negative comments – 
Design attributes  
15  4 12   7   
     Positive and negative 
comments – Use attributes c 
41 13 33 21   
          Total comments 69 43     
       
a Design attributes include A1 (diverse and complementary), A2 (objective and accurate), A4 (cost 
versus benefit), and A5 (causally related) 
b Use attributes include A6 (strategic communication devices), A7 (incentive for improvement), 
and A8 (improved decision-making). Cells with small expected counts (n <5) have been collapsed. 
c Use attributes associated with an entrepreneurial strategy include A6 (strategic communication 
devices) and A8 (improved decision-making). Cells with small expected counts (n <5) have been 
collapsed. 
d Distribution value that contributes the most to the Chi-square statistic.  The 17-comment 
variance represents a 73.9% difference between the actual and expected distribution. 
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e Distribution value that contributes the most to the Chi-square statistic.  The 5-comment variance 
represents a 55.5% difference between the actual and expected distribution. 
f Distribution value that contributes the most to the Chi-square statistic.  The 11-comment 
variance represents a 73.3% difference between the actual and expected distribution. 
To explore whether the company trades-off some attributes for others, comments 
contrary to expectations for dropped measures were investigated further, as shown in Table 10. 
The first column of numbers in Table 10 reproduces comment frequencies shown in Table 6 for 
entrepreneurial use attributes.  The company dropped measures that are strongly perceived as 
strategic communication devices (A6+, 17 comments) and supportive of improved decisions 
(A8+, 20 comments), when straightforward predictions indicate that the measures should have 
been retained.  
Table 10. Research Question 4: 
Trade-Off of Individual Attributes 
  
Comments in Unexpected Direction Associated Unfavorable Comments 
         
Measures are: Favorable Comments 
on Dropped Measures 
A1- A2- A4- A5- A6- A8- None
A6+: Strategic 
communication devices 
17 1 4 2 0 - 1 9 
A8+: Supportive of 
improved decisions 
20 0 6 9 0 0 - 4 
Total 37 1 10 11 0 0 1 13 
Proportions of total 
comments 
1.000 .027 .270 .297 .000 .000 .027 .350 
         
A1-: Not diverse and complementary 
A2-: Not objective and accurate 
A4-: Not more beneficial than costly 
A5-: Not causally related 
A6-: Not strategic communication devices 
A8-: Not supportive of improved decisions 
To determine whether the company trades off these apparently beneficial attributes, we 
investigated comments referring to other attributes within the same section of text.  A qualitative 
database query using Atlas.ti identified co-occurrence or associations between coded sections 
of text.12 The columns of Table 10 labeled A1- to A8- present the number of times that favorable 
comments in the first column are associated with negative comments for each of the other 
attributes. For example, interviewees said that the people-related performance measures, 
among others, help distributors make improved decisions (i.e., support for A8+).  However, the 
people measures (among others) were dropped from the DPM.   
                                                
12 Co-occurrence or proximity rules include coded quotations of one type that enclose, are enclosed by, overlap, are 
overlapped by, preceded by one-line, or followed by one-line coded quotations of another type. See Appendix B of 
Malina and Selto (2001) for a complete discussion of finding associations among codes using qualitative software. 
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The Atlas.ti query tool found co-occurring comments (27 percent of the total) stating that 
the dropped measures, which ought to support improved decisions, are not objective and 
accurate (A2-).  This indicates that the DPM attribute of improved decision-making is 
subordinate to the attribute of objectivity and accuracy.  More co-occurring comments (27.9 
percent) stated that dropped measures were not cost-beneficial.  Almost no other types of co-
occurring negative comments appeared. When the company unexpectedly dropped measures, 
it consistently made choices consistent with the proposition that the attributes of objectivity and 
accuracy (A2) and benefits versus costs (A4) were more important than attributes of strategic 
communication (A6) and support of improved decisions (A8).  
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
This study focuses on the efforts of one large firm to model drivers of its distribution 
performance.  It complements recent research and offers an analytic generalization to an 
emerging theory of performance measurement and management control. This study contributes 
to analytic generalization about performance measurement by empirically examining choices 
and revisions of diverse performance measures in a live setting. The results of this qualitative 
investigation augment previous survey, experimental, and normative studies that collectively are 
refining a theory of performance measurement.    
6.1 Theory-based analyses 
Management control and strategy theories identify at least eight desirable attributes of 
performance measures. Measures should be diverse and complementary, objective and 
accurate, informative, more beneficial than costly, causally related, strategic communication 
devices, incentives for improvement, and supportive of improved decisions.  Analysis of 
interviews with company PMM designers and users find that, taken as a whole, these attributes 
are relevant to decisions to delete or retain performance measures.  This study finds that the 
studied organization’s choices of performance measures appear to be strongly influenced by 
measures’ attributes, consistent with theory.   
Further analysis yields two results related to the attributes’ relative importance for 
retaining or dropping performance measures.  First, the relative importance of performance 
measure attributes in decisions to drop or retain measures differs subtly according to firm 
strategy.  Positive attributes of conservative-strategy measures and relative lack of negative 
attributes of entrepreneurial-oriented measures are associated with the measures retained on 
the PMM. Because the company itself followed a rather conservative strategy, we expected 
conservative-strategy measures to be dropped only if they had an abundance of negative 
attributes. This appeared to be the case. Likewise, because of the top-down nature of 
distribution management, we expected that the company would keep only the entrepreneurial-
strategy measures (urged by entrepreneurial distributors) that had a relative abundance of 
positive attributes. However, in this case, entrepreneurial measures tended to be kept as long 
as they were perceived to not have excessive negative attributes. This result appears somewhat 
inconsistent with our interpretations of prior contingency theory strategic-fit research on 
attributes.   
We identify three possible reasons for this mild contradiction.  First, prior research 
investigates strategy fit at the PMM level, not at the individual-measure level.  Our predictions of 
which attributes are more applicable for the two broad definitions of firm strategy are based on 
the applicability of these PMM-level results to measure-level analysis.  The measurement-level 
of analysis may be contributing to the unexpected result.   
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Second, the classification of firm strategy does not lend itself to a clear-cut conservative 
or entrepreneurial dichotomy. As cautioned by Chenhall (2003), the extant typologies might be 
overly simplistic for modern, dynamic firms.  Most aspects of the company strategy reflect a 
conservative strategy; yet, not all follow neatly in line.  For example, the recent change to focus 
on customer satisfaction is more in line with an entrepreneurial, differentiation strategy than a 
conservative strategy. 
Finally, and related to the difficulty of neatly categorizing a company’s strategy, two 
related entities are being studied.  The company might follow a conservative strategy while the 
distributors, although still fitting mostly into a conservative-strategy classification, have distinct 
entrepreneurial tendencies.  The company’s narrow performance focus had caused 
considerable tension between management and regional distributors who saw more profitable 
opportunities in the company’s secondary markets.  Unlike the company, many distributors’ 
success stems from tapping the less-established and growing secondary markets.  This 
strategic tension played out in the evolution of a PMM for the distribution channel and may be 
contributing to the subtle difference in criteria for keeping or dropping performance measures. In 
other words, distributors, because they have direct impacts on customers and company sales, 
might have more influence on PMM design than we anticipated. 
6.2 Exploratory analyses 
Attributes that we associated with design appear to be more influential than those 
associated with use.  This finding led to an investigation of trade-offs among attributes.  
Although all of the attributes might be desirable, the two attributes that appear most associated 
with keeping or dropping individual DPM measures are (a) the objectivity and accuracy of 
measures and (b) the cost versus benefit balance of measurement.  A measure might promote 
good decision-making and communicate strategy, for example, but the company dropped it if 
experience showed it could not be measured inexpensively, accurately and objectively.  Trade-
offs also permitted a more detailed analysis of the effect of strategy on PMM choice.  At an 
aggregate level, only a subtle difference was found in the importance of attributes consistent 
with either a conservative versus an entrepreneurial strategy.  However, at the individual-
attribute level, we find that objectivity and accuracy (as well as cost versus benefit—both 
consistent with the company’s conservative strategy) accompany changes in DPM measures. 
6.3 Discussion 
The trade-off of attributes can be seen clearly in the treatment of market-share 
measures.  As mentioned previously, the company initially emphasized the importance of the 
traditional, primary market share.  Primary market share was important to corporate strategy, 
but the company also had the ability to measure primary market share extremely accurately and 
objectively. Many distributors complained that the traditional market did not afford them growth 
opportunities and that more weight should be attached to new market shares. Unfortunately, 
new market shares are difficult to measure accurately and objectively. The company ultimately 
eliminated all the market-share measures from the DPM.  The company decided to move the 
weight assigned to primary market share to sales-growth measures.  Measurement of sales 
growth is easily obtained, and relatively accurate and objective for both the traditional market 
and the new markets, although sales growth does not speak directly to the company’s strategy 
to grow market share. However, the addition of sales-growth measures retained diversity among 
measures and recognized distributors’ entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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Apparently this company, with its long history of conservative, bottom-line financial 
management, could not tolerate subjectivity in measurement or high costs of improved 
information, nor could it tolerate the costly disputes that inevitably follow the use of subjective 
measures for performance evaluations and contracting. This finding has implications for the use 
of performance measures (e.g., some non-financial measures) that cannot be measured or 
audited as objectively or accurately as financial measures. For example, many organizations 
currently measure employee capabilities; some might use these measures in performance 
evaluations. A full understanding of the “softness” of such measures might preclude non-
productive disputes that can arise if they are used to evaluate and reward performance, 
particularly in firms that are accustomed to using hard, financial measures.  The creative task 
facing PMM designers is to find measures that are: diverse and complementary, informative, 
strategic communication devices, incentives for improvement, supportive of improved decisions, 
causally related, but are also objective and accurate and not too costly. Clearly, this is a 
challenging task. 
6.4 Future research   
Future research might replicate this study in similar or dissimilar firms or to a large 
sample of diverse firms to obtain useful contrasts or further support for the theory of 
performance-measurement models. Future research questions include: 
• What are the measurement tradeoffs among measure attributes that might be necessary 
to implement feasible PMM?  
• Do all firms (or only those with a conservative strategy) stress cost of measurement, 
accuracy and objectivity of performance measures above all other attributes? 
• Is complementarity an issue beyond initial design? Do returns or tradeoffs to scale and 
scope of measurement exist? 
• What are the performance opportunity costs of trading-off performance-measure 
attributes? 
6.5 Epilogue   
Three years after the introduction of the DPM, as reported in Malina and Selto (2001), 
distributors’ measured financial performance improved significantly. The DPM is alive and well 
as of May 2005, and it is used for managing and evaluating distributors and distributorships. 
Top management commitment to using and refining the DPM was and continues to be strong. 
Distributors continue to adapt their behavior to the DPM’s guidance, and the DPM has 
undergone several more changes since the completion of this research. An example of 
adaptation is that all distributors now meet the DPM’s challenging safety goal, despite many 
early complaints that it was an impossible standard (see Malina & Selto, 2001). Changes to the 
DPM include dropping formal reporting of profit (PBIT/S) because of unforeseen claims by labor 
unions for a greater share of profits, and inclusion of several new measures that had been 
proposed earlier but not yet developed. The DPM continues to be the center point of the 
contract-renewal process, and its increasing objectivity and relevance has added to its 
acceptance. The DPM has become an integral part of management control at this company and 
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